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DEATH AS A BARGAINING CHIP: PLEA BARGAINING
AND THE FUTURE OF VIRGINIA'S DEATH PENALTY
John G. Douglass *
Virginia now averages less than a single death sentence each
year,1 a far cry from its not-too-distant history as the second most
active death penalty state in the nation. 2 The numbers alone
tempt us to forecast the death of Virginia's death penalty: a death
by disuse. But those numbers leave much of the story untold. The
plummeting number of death sentences is only the diminishing
tip of a larger, more stable iceberg of capital case litigation. That
iceberg is melting very slowly, if at all.
Though death sentences are increasingly rare, capital indictments are not. Even as death sentences decline, capital charging
in Virginia persists at a relatively stable rate. 3 As a result, Virginia prosecutors now charge about twenty cases of capital mur1
der annually for each case that results in a death sentence.
What happens to the other nineteen cases? Plea bargaining
fills much of that gap. Today, even more than in years past, Virginia's death penalty functions primarily as a bargaining chip in
* Profes~or of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. My thanks to David
Johnson and Maria Jankowski for helpful insights. Thanks also to D.J. Geiger, the principal author of the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission Report, see infra Part I.D, for her
thoroughness in assembling and organizing data on capital indictments. And thanks to
Laura Joseph for very capable assistance with research.
1. Since 2004, Virginia courts have sentenced nine people to death. Death Sentences
in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Feb. 27,
2015) [hereinafter Death Sentences by State/Year].
2. Virginia has executed 110 people in the post-1976 "modern" era of the death penalty. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-execu tions-state-and-region-197 6 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Executions by State]. Prior to 2014, that placed Virginia second
behind Texas's 508 executions. Id. In 2014, Oklahoma executed three individuals and now
occupies second position with 111 executions. Id.
3. VA. INDIGENT DEF'. COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICES apps. A,
B (2013) [hereinafter VIDC HEVIEW]; see infra Part I.D.
4. Id.
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a plea negotiation process that resolves most capital litigation
with sentences less than death. 5 Virginia prosecutors have not
abandoned the death penalty. Instead, increasingly, they bargain
with it.
This reality has important implications for the future of Virginia's death penalty. This symposium essay addresses two related
concerns. The first relates to fairness. The second relates to cost.
First, fairness. Because charging and plea negotiation decisions
are made by independently elected commonwealth's attorneys
across Virginia, and because different prosecutors make those decisions very differently, it has long been true that the locality
where a murder occurs is a principal factor in determining who
gets death, and who gets life. 6 While plea negotiations may bring
fewer death sentences, an imbalance remains across jurisdictions
in both capital indictments and death sentences. 7 If our aim is
like treatment of like cases across the Commonwealth, we remain
a long way from achieving that aim.
This leads to a second concern: cost. Because so many capital
cases are resolved by post-indictment plea bargaining, after much
of the time-consuming work of investigators, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and experts has already taken place, the financial costs
of our death penalty system will remain relatively high, despite
the decline in actual death sentences. 8 In a world of limited resources and tight budgets, that cost is likely to attract increasing
concern.

5. See infra Part I.D.
6. See JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REvmw OF
VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 27-31, (2002) [hereinafter JLARC REPORT],
available at jlarc.virginia.gov/reports/Rpt274.pdf; infra Part I.F.
7. See infra Part I.F.
8. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seeh the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 861-66 (2007)
(discussing the cost-benefit "disconnect" in a national context). Many of those costs are
borne by statewide budgets rather than by local taxpayers. Id. at 864. But the bargaining
"advantages" of the death penalty are not spread evenly across the state. Id. at 862-63.
Those advantages go only to prosecutors willing to use death as a bargaining chip, and
most heavily to those who use that chip routinely. Id. at 876--77. Hence there is a political
"disconnect" between those who seek the advantage of death bargaining and those who
bear the costs. Id. As cost-related arguments gain prominence in the death penalty debate,
this "disconnect" may emerge as a central element in that debate. Id. at 893. The many
are paying for the tactical advantage of the few.
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Modest and achievable reforms would both promote fairness
and reduce costs with little impact on current sentencing outcomes. That kind of reform should interest policymakers regardless of their views on the death penalty. This symposium essay
concludes by outlining those possibilities for the future.
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT: CAPITAL CHARGING PERSISTS AT A
RELATIVELY STABLE RATE IN VIRGINIA WHILE PLEA BARGAINING
INCREASINGLY RESOLVES CASES SHORT OF DEA'l'H SENTENCES

A. The Decline of Death Sentences
The numbers tell us that the death penalty is in retreat across
9
the world, across the United States, and in Virginia. Viewed in
light of human history across centuries, the decline of capital
punishment is unmistakable. 10 After all, Henry VIII's royal courts
condemned more prisoners to death in an average week than Virginia sentenced to death in the past decade. 11 In the United
States, death sentences have declined for most of the past twenty
years. 12 Since a post-Furman 1 a high of over 300 death sentences
per year in the mid-1990s, death sentences have dropped steadily
to about eighty per year. 1·1

9. STEVEN PINKEH, THE BETTER ANGELS OF Oun NATURI,: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 149-50 (2011); Death Sentences by State/Year, supra note 1.
10. PINKER, supra note 9, at 149-53.
11. Compare PINKER, supra note 9, at 149 (discussing Henry VIII's rate of execution),
with Executions by State, supra note 2 (showing a consistent decline in death penalty use
in the United States). Most of the world, and virtually all of Europe, has abolished death
as a punishment for crime. PINKEH, supra note 9, at 149-50. Six American states have
abolished capital punishment in the past decade. States With and Without the Death Pen·
alty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-withoutdeath-penalty (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). Not surprisingly, observers typically look at the·
se numbers and predict a future with no death penalty. See PINKER, supra note 9, at 15053 (discussing reasons for the movement away from the death penalty internationally, and
finding that abolishing death as a punishment had no observable consequences). To some,
the future is now: "(E]ven the American death penalty, for all its notoriety, is more sym·
bolic than real," writes Steven Pinker in his comprehensive study of human violence. Id. at
150.
12. See Death Sentences by Year: 1976-2012, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-year- 1977-2009 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015)
[hereinafter Death Sentences by Year].
13. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (holding that the death penalty
as implemented in several states would "constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments").
14. Death Sentences by Year, supra note 12.
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Virginia's recent history mirrors the national trend. For three
decades following Furman, Virginia executed more people than
any state but Texas, 15 and did so more "efficiently"-meaning a
higher percentage of death sentences resulted in execution, and
did so more quickly after death sentence-than any other state. 16
From 1995 to 1999, Virginia courts were still averaging about five
11
death sentences per year. Since 2004, however, death sentences
in those same courts diminished to less than one per year. 18 Since
the sentencing of Robert Charles Gleason, Jr. in 2011, 19 Virginia
has produced no new death sentences. 20

B. The ''Funneling" Process in Capital Cases
While death sentences are in steep decline, death penalty cases
are not. The docket of capital litigation in Virginia remains much
larger than the comparatively few death sentences that it produces.21 This is because most capital cases are resolved before trial
through a "winnowing" or "funneling" process. 22 At the top of the
funnel, the process begins with dozens of arrests for capitaleligible crimes. 2:i As cases move down the funnel through indictment and pretrial litigation, we see capital cases turned into noncapital dispositions, sometimes through unilateral prosecutorial
choice, but most often by a negotiated guilty plea to something

15. Executions by State, supra note 2.
16. See AM. BAR ASS'N, EVALUATING FAIHNESS AND ACCUHACY IN STATE DEATH
PENALTY SYS'l'f~MS: 'l'HE VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 1 (2013) [hereinafter ABA ASSESSMENT]; King Salim Khalfani & Stephen A. Northup, Virginia and the
Death Penalty, DAILY PROGHESS (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/vir
ginia-and-the-death-penalty/article_9a0b7dee- 7 5f7-5364-940a-ba2236e2545b.html?mode=
jqm ("The average time between conviction and execution in Virginia is less than eight
years, by far the shortest in the nation.").
17. Death Sentences by State/Year, supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. Gleason, a death row prisoner who killed another inmate, told the court he would
kill again and essentially asked for the death penalty. See Gleason v. Commonwealth, 726
S.E.2d 351, 352, 354 (Va. 2012).
20. Virginia Capital Litigation Data, VA. CAP. CASE CLEAHINGHOUSE, http://www.
vc3.org/resources/page.asp?pageid=561 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter VCCC Data] (compiling data in an excel spreadsheet accessible through the hyperlink).
21. See JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at 16-17 (noting that from 1995-1999 out of
215 capital-eligible cases only 24 resulted in death sentences).
22. For a visual depiction of this "funnel," see id. at IL
23. See id. at 16-17 (noting that from 1995-1999 there were 215 arrests that were eligible for capital punishment).
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less than a death sentence. 21 At the narrow bottom of the funnel,
a handful of cases go to trial where contests over guilt-or, more
typically, over sentencing-winnow a bit more. 25 Those contested
cases produce a trickle of death sentences at the exit of the funnel.2c
This funneling process has little to do with the legislature, or
even the judiciary. It has a fair amount to do with the skill and
tenacity of defense lawyers. It has lots to do with the discretion of
prosecutors.
As for the legislature, Virginia's broad capital murder statute
21
allows for a wide open entrance at the top of the funnel. Capital
murder encompasses fifteen different categories of intentional
homicide, 28 including (the most frequently charged) killing in the
commission of robbery. 29 Steal the victim's wallet and "ordinary"
murder becomes capital-eligible. 30 Once the capital murder is
proved, Virginia's statutory prerequisites for a death sentence
leave plenty of room for discretion. The jury can vote death if it
finds the defendant's conduct "vile, horrible or inhuman" or if it
31
finds defendant "a continuing serious threat to society."
As for the judiciary, Virginia law provides two opportunities for
courts to participate in the funneling process by exercising judg32
ment that a case does not merit a death sentence. First, after a
jury votes death, a Virginia court may set aside the death sentence and impose a life sentence. 33 That power is entirely discre31
tionary and may be exercised "upon good cause shown."
24. See, e.g., id. at 43.
25. See id. at 16-17; Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CHIMINOLOGY 475, 487-88 (2013) (discussing the incentives for going to trial in deathpenalty cases).
26. See JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
27. See id. at 14 (recognizing the increase in capital-eligible arrests as a result of legislative expansion of the capital murder statute).
28. VA. Com~ ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 2014). Virginia's history of expanding the
number of offenses eligible for the death penalty is outlined in ABA ASSESSMENT, supra
note 16, at 5 & n.37.; see also JLAHC Report, supra note 6, at 8-11.
29. VA. COIJE ANN.§ 18.2-31; see JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 16, 30.
30. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31.
31. Id. § 19.2-264.2.
32. Notably, Virginia courts have no discretion before trial to determine that death is
an inappropriate punishment. See In re Horan, 634 S.E.2d 675, 678-79 (Va. 2006).
33. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5.
34. Id.
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Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia must review every
death sentence to determine whether it is "excessive or disproportionate."35 Though legislation explicitly grants these judicial powers, courts almost never exercise them to winnow out questionable death sentences. Of the dozens of death sentences voted by
juries in the post-Furman decades, Virginia trial judges have
found "good cause" to set aside only a tiny fraction. 36 And the Supreme Court of Virginia has never found a death sentence "exces37
sive or disproportionate."
At trial, of course, juries typically make the ultimate choice of
life or death, 38 but the vast majority of capital cases never get to a
jury verdict. 39 Most of the funneling occurs before that. 4° Fifteen to
twenty years ago, prosecutors winnowed out about 60% of capital
murder indictments before trial with-usually bargained for41
choices not to seek death, Now that winnowing process disposes
of close to 90% of capital murder indictments. 42 Virginia juries ul35. Id.§ 17.l-313(C).
36. I have found no record of a Virginia trial court reducing a jury verdict of death
penalty to a lesser sentence based on "good cause." Accounts of practitioners suggest it almost never happens. The ABA assessment does not mention any case where such a reduction occurred. See generally ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16 (lacking any example of a
court's exercising its discretion under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.5).
37. See ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 218; JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at IV
(noting that none of 119 death sentences in its study were found disproportionate by the
Supreme Court of Virginia); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(C). In theory at least there
are scenarios in which Virginia trial judges play a role in selecting life or death. If the case
is tried to the court without a jury, the judge has the power to sentence. But in Virginia
both parties must waive jury before the court is empowered to try and sentence. A prosecutor seeking a death sentence is unlikely to concur in a jury waiver where he believes the
court is inclined to life. And a defendant is unlikely to waive a jury in front of a judge inclined toward a death sentence. Hence jury waivers, when they occur, tend to come as part
of an agreement where the prosecutor agrees not to pursue death. In a few cases where
the evidence of guilt is clear and the defendant calculates the chances for a life sentence
are stronger without a jury, defendants have entered guilty pleas to capital murder (i.e.,
without a plea agreement binding on the court) and courts have sentenced to life. The risk
in that tactic, of course, is that the defendant acknowledges guilt with no guarantee that
he will avoid a death sentence. See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 636, 639 (Va.
1993) (affirming a death sentence entered by a trial judge following a guilty plea despite
the commonwealth's recommendation of a life sentence).
38. The JLARC report documented jury sentencings in 53% of cases where the prosecutor sought death all the way through a contested verdict. JLARC REPORT, supra note 6,
at 49, 52.
39. See id. at 16-17.
40. See id. at 16.
41. See id. at II, 35-36, 40-41 (finding that prosecutors actively sought the death penalty through a contested verdict in only 64 of 170 cases indicted as capital murder).
42. See infra Part I.D.
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timately decide life or death in only about 8% of indicted capital
murder cases. 13
Prosecutors, more than legislators, courts, or juries, control the
funnel. Virginia commonwealth's attorneys control the entrance
to the funnel when they decide whether to present an indictment
for capital murder to a grand jury. 44 After a capital indictment is
filed and defense counsel is appointed, negotiations between
prosecutors and defense attorneys largely determine whether a
defendant will ever face a trial or sentencing where death is actu45
ally contested.
C. Winnowing by the Numbers: A Tale of Two Studies
Before I get too deep into the numbers, I will offer a few words
about the sources and the limits of the data I have examined.
First, a word about sources: In large measure, the numbers
come from two studies undertaken more than a decade apart. The
studies offer snapshots of death penalty case processing in Virginia during two (roughly) five-year periods, 1995 to 1999 and 2008
to 2013, and hence give us some idea of trends across almost
twenty years.
The first study was published in 2002 by the Joint Legislative
Audit and Review Commission of the Virginia General Assembly
46
("JLARC"). JLARC undertook the study in response to concerns
about the uneven exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the application of Virginia's death penalty. 47 JLARC staff reviewed data
from Virginia State Police arrests, Sentencing Commission records of case dispositions, and-in a smaller sample of casescommonwealth's attorneys' case files. 18 The JLARC data covered
capital crimes occurring between 1995 and 1999. 19 To date, the
43. Id.
44. See .JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at IV, 17.
45. See Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory
Study, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 313, 323 (2008).
46. JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at I.
47. The principal concern giving rise to the JLARC study was the perception of racial
disparity in capital punishment. The principal conclusion of the study, however, was that
prosecutors in highly populated localities were much less likely to seek the death penalty
than their counterparts in less populated jurisdictions. Id. at Preface, iii-iv, 28.
48. Id. at 19-23.
49. Id. at 12, 19. JLARC chose 1995 as the starting point because that was the year
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JLARC study remains the most comprehensive study of prosecu50
torial discretion in Virginia death penalty cases.
The second study was documented in a 2013 report by the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission ("VIDC") to the General Assembly, and it analyzed the caseloads of the four regional Capital
Defender Offices ("CDOs") that defend a substantial portion of
51
Virginia's capital cases. During the 2013 session, the General
Assembly directed VIDC to undertake a study in order to determine whether, in light of the declining number of death sentences, resources committed to capital defense should be reallocated
to other tasks. 02 VIDC staff combed through court records and
CDO case files to identify capital cases charged from 2008
53
through October 2013. VIDC found that, despite declining death
sentences, the workload at regional CDOs remained substantial. 51
The reason is that the stream of indicted capital cases continues
at a steady rate, even as death sentencing diminishes. 55
Now, the disclaimer. Because the two studies used different data sources and sought to answer different questions, there is no
simple, direct way to compare the two. While I am confident that
the major trends in capital charging and plea bargaining that I
identify are supported by the data, I do not claim to have undertaken the kind of thorough, case-by-case review that would be
necessary for more precise conclusions. Nor do I claim that this
short symposium essay undertakes the kind of detailed statistical
analysis that this topic deserves. Hence, my first observation
about the "future" of Virginia's death penalty is that we need

Virginia abolished parole. Id. Based on statements by a number of commonwealth's attorneys, JLARC believed that the option of life without parole had a significant impact on
charging and plea decisions by prosecutors. Id. at 31.
50. See id. at i-iii. The ABA assessment attempted a survey of charging practices by
commonwealth's attorneys, but received few responses from prosecutors. ABA
ASSESSMEN1', supra note 16, at xviii.
51. VIDC REVIEW, supra note 3, at 2.
52. Id. The author of this symposium essay serves as a member of the VIDC.
53. Id. at 4. VIDC's principal source was the Supreme Court of Virginia's Circuit
Court Case Management System, though the study highlights important gaps in that information. Id. at 4-5. To fill those gaps VIDC staff sought additional data directly from
Circuit Court Clerks and from CDO case files. Id.
54. Id. at 2 (concluding that the CDOs "are not overstaffed").
55. See id. at 6.
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more complete data and a comprehensive study of capital charging and plea bargaining patterns before we can fully assess these
trends.

D. Comparing Capital Indictment Rates and Capital Trial Rates
Across Twenty Years: Capital Charging Holds Steady, but
Capital Trials Diminish
In examining the JLARC and VIDC studies, this symposium
essay aims to compare, across a twenty-year period, the discretionary choices of Virginia prosecutors at two key stages in capital cases: the indictment stage and the pretrial (or plea bargaining) stage. First, when presented with an arrest for a capital
crime, how often do Virginia prosecutors seek an indictment for
capital murder? I will call that the "capital indictment rate." Second, once a capital indictment is filed, how often does the case
make it to a contested verdict where the death penalty remains at
issue? That's the "capital trial rate." By comparing capital indictment rates with capital trial rates, we can get a rough idea of
how often capital charges are bargained away after indictment for
a resolution less than death. Then, by comparing the data from
the JLARC and VIDC studies, we can see how those choices have
changed (or not changed) across a period of almost twenty years.
To calculate a capital indictment rate, JLARC first had to identify and count the capital-eligible murder arrests from which a
prosecutor might select cases for capital indictment. 56 That turned
out to be a difficult task because arrest warrants and police databases do not readily indicate whether a murder includes the elements necessary to charge a capital crime. 57 After substantial effort, including examination of individual case files, and even some
interviews with commonwealth's attorneys, JLARC identified 215
arrests for capital-eligible crimes between 1995 and 1999, an average of forty-three per year. 58

56. JLARC REPOR'l', supra note 6, at 31, app. C.
57. Id. at 14, 20. JLARC looked at state police records of 970 murder arrests in an effort to identify which were "capital eligible." But the arrest records do not distinguish
among types of murder. Id. at 20. Hence, to "approximate" the number of capital-eligible
arrests, JLARC staff undertook the labor-intensive task of reviewing Sentencing Commission data and indictments. Id. In some cases they even interviewed prosecutors. Id.
58. Id. at 14, 16-17, 19-20.
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Out of that universe of 215 eligible cases, Virginia prosecutors
obtained capital murder indictments in 170 cases, an average of
thirty-four per year. 59 Hence JLARC calculated a capital indictment rate of 79%. 60 As JLARC summarized its finding, "nearly
eight out of every 10 persons who were arrested for a capital eligible crime were indicted for capital murder." 61 While that percentage may seem high, at least to those who feel the death penalty should be reserved for the "worst of the worst," JLARC's
statistical findings were consistent with responses to surveys it
sent to all 121 commonwealth's attorneys. Sixty percent responded that they "always seek a capital murder indictment when the
elements of the offense warrant the charge."62 JLARC's findings
suggest that, at least as of the late 1990s, Virginia prosecutors on
the whole were disinclined to "winnow out" many potential capital cases at the indictment stage.
Now let's move forward about fifteen years, through a period
when death sentencing was declining by more than 80%. 63 We
might expect a parallel drop in the annual number of capital indictments from the JLARC average of thirty-four per year. 64 But
the decline is much more modest. The VIDC study counted 131
capital indictments from 2008 through October 2013, an average
of about twenty-two per year. 65 In other words, death charging declined by only about 35% even as death sentencing declined by
80%. Death charging is declining much more modestly than death
sentencing.
Still, we need to address another important variable before we
can appreciate how little the capital indictment rate has changed
over time. From how many capital-eligible arrests did prosecutors
select those twenty-two per year for capital indictment? That
question, unfortunately, is hard to answer directly without exam-

59. Id. at 16-17.
60. Id. at 32.
61. Id. at III.
62. Id. at 31; see also ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 118 & n.51 (quoting a news
report of a commonwealth's attorney who often "charge[s] capital murder even if it's questionable as whether or not it fits in that category").
63. See Death Sentences by State/Year, supra note 3 (demonstrating a decline in
death sentences from an average of five per year between 1995-1999 to less than one per
year between 2004-2013).
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
65. See VIDC HEVIEW, supra note 3, at app. B.
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ining the individual facts of hundreds of murder arrests. But one
key fact seems almost certain: the number of capital-eligible arrests has gone down-a lot-since the mid-1990s. 66 That is because violent crime in general, and homicides in particular, has
dropped dramatically across the past two decades. 67 Using the
midpoints of the JLARC study (1997) and the VIDC study (2010)
as points of reference, the annual number of arrests for murder in
Virginia has dropped from 424 to 293, a decline of 30%. 68 Assuming the rate of capital-eligible murders goes up or down roughly
at the same rate as murders in general, that would suggest that
the annual pool of capital-eligible murder arrests has shrunk by
30% during the years between the JLARC and VIDC studies.
That would create an annual pool of about thirty capital-eligible
murder arrests, from which Virginia prosecutors annually obtained twenty-two capital murder indictments. That results in a
capital indictment rate of 73% for the years 2009 to 2013, only a
small step lower than the 79% calculated by JLARC for 1995 to
1999.
In sum, while capital indictments have declined by about a
third from the late 1990s to the past few years, that decline is
almost entirely attributable to the decline in violent crime across
the same period. It is not because Virginia prosecutors are significantly more selective in their capital indictment decisions.
Now to the second question: the capital trial rate. How many of
those capital murder cases actually get to a contested life-ordeath verdict? The JLARC study of 1995-1999 cases documented
the winnowing of 170 capital murder indictments down to sixtyfour cases where prosecutors actively sought the death penalty

66. See, e.g., FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013 tbl.1 (2014), available at http:
//www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/ltable
datadecoverviewpdf/table_l_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume_and_rate_per_ 10000
O_inhabitants_l994-2013.xls (indicating that the murder rate in the United States has
declined from 9.0 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994 to 4.5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013).
67. See id. (revealing that the number of violent crimes and murders in 2013 is significantly lower than the number of violent crimes and murders in 1994).
68. Compare FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 286
tbl.69 (1998), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/1997/97sec
4.pdf, with FBI, CHIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2010, tbl.69 (2011), available at http://ww
w .fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u. s/201 O/crime-in-the-u.s. -201O/tables/1 Otbl69.xls.
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through a contested trial or sentencing. 69 That's a capital trial
rate of 38%. 70
Both the number and the rate of capital trials have dropped
significantly since 1999. 'fhe available data on capital indictment
dispositions from the VIDC study shows trials in about 19% of
capital cases between 2008 and 2013. 71 Even that number may
substantially overstate the percentage of cases where the death
penalty is actually contested through verdict. That is because half
72
of those trials are bench trials. In Virginia, a trial to the court
occurs only where both parties agree to waive a jury. 73 A defendant's agreement to waive a jury sometimes accompanies a prosecutor's agreement not to argue for death. 71

69. JLARC REPOR'r, supra note 6, at 17 fig. 7.
70. If that number seems small think again. On average, noncapital cases go to trial
at a much lower rate. Since parole was abolished in 1995, the rate of jury sentencing
(which parallels the rate of jury trial) in felony cases has dipped well below 2%, and has
dropped to about 4% in cases of crimes against the person. See VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N,
2013 ANNUAL REPORT 30-31 (2013) [hereinafter VCSC REPORT], available at http://www.
vcsc.virginia.gov/2013Annua1Report.pdf.
71. The VIDC study itself did not analyze case dispositions. I was able to review the
work papers for the VIDC study, which included spreadsheets from the Supreme Court of
Virginia case management system, listing capital murder indictments from 2008 through
2013, and including the disposition in most cases. See Spreadsheets Listing Capital Murder Indictments from 2008 to 2013 (unpublished data) (on file with the Supreme Court of
Virginia Case Management System). Where the spreadsheets did not record a disposition,
I checked the Virginia Circuit Court Case Information website. Circuit Court Case Information, VA. CTS. CASE INFO., http://wasdmz2.courts.state.va.us/CJISWeb/circuit.jsp (last
visited Feb. 27, 2015). Finally, I included dispositions reported by CDOs and reflected in
Appendix C to the VIDC study. VIDC REVIEW, supra note 3, at app. C. From that collection of sources I was able to identify dispositions in 100 cases that had been indicted as
capital murder. John G. Douglass, Totals w/CCM Data (unpublished research notes) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Douglass Notes]. Of those, forty-three were resolved by
guilty plea and twenty-four by nolle prosequi. Id. (In some of the nolle prossed cases I was
able to identify a superseding indictment followed by guilty plea to a lesser charge). Nine
other cases showed capital charges amended to first or second degree murder. Id. Five
cases were listed as "other." Id. 'rhere were nine jury trials and ten tried by "judge with
witnesses." Id. The breakdown of bench trials versus jury trials appears roughly constant
since the JLARC study, which documented jury verdicts in 53% of cases where prosecutors
sought death. See JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 49, 52 fig.18.
72. Douglass Notes, supra note 71 (indicating that there were nine jury trials and ten
bench trials).
73. VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-257 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 659 (Pa. 1998); Cary Aspinwall, Kevin Sweat Won't Face Death Penalty in Killings of Weleetha Girls, Fiancee, TULSA
WOHLD (July 11, 2014, 3:19 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/kevin-sweat-wo
n-t-face-death-penalty-in-killings-of/article_320f9865-98f3-5b7f-83cl-5e6408e5f383.html;
Mark Walters, Judge Denies New Trial for Adams Man Convicted of Murder; Appeal Filed,
EVENING SUN (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://www.eveningsun.com/local/ci_24949615/
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In sum, when presented with a capital-eligible crime, Virginia
commonwealth's attorneys continue to seek capital indictments at
a relatively steady rate. Since the late 1990s, their capital indictment rate has dipped only slightly, from 79% to 73%. 75 But as
the years have passed, Virginia prosecutors increasingly have
chosen not to pursue death all the way through a contested trial
and sentencing. The capital trial rate has been sliced in half, from
38% to 19% and the jury trial rate is even lower. 76 Juries now
make the death penalty decision in only about 9% of Virginia cases that start with a capital murder indictment. 77

E. Post-Indictment Plea Bargaining Increasingly Resolves
Capital Cases Short of a Death Sentence
An increasingly small percentage of capital murder indictments ultimately leads to a trial where death is at issue. Why?
The most likely-perhaps the quite obvious-answer is plea bargaining.
Of course, not all of the winnowing that occurs after indictment
and before trial is the result of agreement. Prosecutors sometimes
make the unilateral decision to take death off the table. 78 And

judge-denies-new-trial-adams-man-convicted-murder. Some of these bench trials, in the
vocabulary of practitioners, are "slow guilty pleas." See, e.g., Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz, 915
F.2d 106, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1990).
75. Compare JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 fig. 7 (showing that there were 170
capital murder indictments out of 215 capital-eligible offenses between 1995 and 1999,
indicating a capital indictment rate of 79%), with VIDC REVIEW, supra. note 3, at app. B
(indicating that there were an average of twenty-two capital indictments per year between
2008 and 2013, which is a capital indictment rate of 73% assuming there were approximately thirty capital-eligible murder arrests per year during the same time frame).
76. Compare JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 fig.7 (illustrating a winnowing of 170
capital murder indictments down to 64 cases of prosecutors seeking the death penalty, a
capital trial rate of 38%), with supra note 52 (tracing my analysis of trials in Virginia between 2008 and 2013, which reveals a 19% capital trial rate).
77. My calculation of a 9% jury trial rate for the years 2008 through 2013 appears
roughly consistent. with data from the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse ("VCCC"). The
VCCC data documents seventeen jury trials in the seven years from 2005 through 2011,
resulting in eight death sentences. See ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 142 (citing
VCCC Data). If we assume an annual rate of twenty-five capital indictments, seventeen
jury trials in that span would amount to about 9% of cases.
78. See, e.g., Michael Gordon, State Will Not Seeh Death Penalty Against Bianca
'Tanner's Boyfriend, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserv
er.com/2014/11/20/5329443/state-will-not-seek-death-penalty .html#.VG-4vlfF-IO; Elliot C.
McLaughlin, Prosecution Will Not Seeh Death Penalty in Georgia Hot Car Death, CNN
(Oct. 9, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/24/justice/georgia-ross-harris-hot-car-
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even defendants facing capital charges sometimes plead guilty
"straight up" with no bargain in place. 70 Still, the available data
confirms what experience and anecdotal reports suggest: that
such unilateral post-indictment decisions probably account for a
small number of cases. 80 The decline in capital trials results mostly from prosecutors' increasing willingness to trade capital charges for guilty pleas.
Why are Virginia prosecutors more willing to resolve capital
cases short of a death sentence? Life without parole surely has
made a difference. For many prosecutors, no doubt, the option of
life without parole diminishes the need for death sentences by
providing a means to ensure that the most dangerous offenders
remain in prison for life. 81 So, plea bargaining that tilts away
from death seems increasingly likely once life without parole is on
the table.
But life without parole only partially explains the decline in
contested capital trials. Virginia abolished parole in 1995. 82 So, to
the extent that the life-without-parole option impacts charging
and plea bargaining, we would expect that the JLARC study of
cases from 1995 to 1999 would already account for most of that

death-penalty/. I am unaware of data which would document how often such unilateral
choices by prosecutors occur after a capital indictment. My conversations with practitioners, both prosecutors and defense attorneys, suggest they are relatively rare.
79. Virginia's latest death sentence came in such a case. See Gleason v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 351, 352-53 (Va. 2012); see also Frank Green, Robert Charles Gleason
Jr., Who Strangled 'l'wo Fellow Prison Inmates, Executed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan.
17, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/robert-charles-gleason-jr-whostrangled-two-fellow-prison-inmates/article_2be8dc8d-92a6-5b8d-ab68-d2fbe9ae8c4f.html
(explaining that Gleason plead guilty and told his lawyers not to oppose the death penalty).
80. Unfortunately, the available data made it difficult to identify bargained outcomes
with precision. JLARC did not distinguish cases winnowed after indictment by negotiated
guilty plea from cases in which prosecutors unilaterally chose not to pursue a death sentence after capital indictment. And the VIDC study was not intended to address case dispositions. Accounts from prosecutors and defense lawyers confirm that dismissal or
amendment of capital charges typically occurs pursuant to plea agreement and coincides
with a guilty plea to amended charges (usually first degree murder). In reviewing Circuit
Court Case Information data on case dispositions, I was able to confirm that pattern in a
number of cases reported as resolved by guilty plea or nolle prosequi. Douglass Notes, supra note 71.
81. See JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at 12 (reporting views of some prosecutors that
the option of life without parole decreased the likelihood they would pursue the death
penalty).
82. Id.
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impact. 83 But the capital trial rate has dropped by half since that
study. 84 Something else has happened in the past fifteen years to
increase the chances that prosecutors will choose to resolve capital cases short of a contested trial with death still on the table.
That "something," most likely, is a vigorous defense. The most
significant change in capital litigation since the days of the
JLARC study has been in capital case defense. In 2002 the Virginia General Assembly authorized the creation of four regional
CDOs under the supervision of the VIDC. 85 In all capital cases
since 2004, Virginia courts have been required to appoint two defense attorneys, including one from a CD0. 86 State funds were
appropriated to staff CDOs with experienced, specialized defense
counsel and to provide for investigators and mitigation specialists. At about the same time, Virginia adopted detailed standards
for appointment of counsel, increased compensation, and removed
fee caps for appointed counsel in capital cases. 87 It is no accident
that the decline in death sentencing coincides with these reforms.
A capable and vigorous defense clearly makes a difference, and
that defense no doubt accounts-at least in part-for the increased willingness of prosecutors to resolve capital cases short of
death.

F. Plea Bargaining: The "Locality Effect"
Virginia has 121 elected commonwealth's attorneys, one for
each independent city or county. 88 Their views on death penalty
charging differ substantially. Many feel it is their public duty to
89
pursue a capital indictment whenever the facts allow. Others
exercise discretion to limit capital charges to the worst of the
83. Indeed, that is one reason the JLARC study chose 1995 as its starting point: to
control for any influences that abolition of parole might bring to prosecutors' choices to
pursue the death penalty. Id.
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
85. See ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 143-44.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Cum. Supp. 2014). There are exceptions where the
RCDO has a conflict of interest or where the court finds that appointment of non-CDO
counsel is "necessary to attain the ends of justice." Id.§ 19.2-163.4.
87. See ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 146; JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
88. VA. CODE ANN.§ 15.2-1626.
89. The JLARC staff surveyed commonwealth's attorneys and reported that "60 percent indicated that they always seek a capital murder indictment when the elements of
the offense warrant the charge." JLARC REPOR'l', supra note 6, at 31.
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worst. 90 Many defer to the choices of victims' families. 91 Some
choose to avoid capital prosecutions simply because they are too
•
92
expensive.

It should come as no surprise, then, that location plays a big
role in determining who faces capital indictment and who ultimately receives a death sentence. The principal finding of the
JLARC study was that "[l]ocation, more than any other factor,
impacted the probability that prosecutors would actually seek the
death penalty for capital murder cases." 93
While capital indictment policies account for some of this "locality effect," most of the difference comes at the plea bargaining
stage. According to JLARC, the differential among localities became more pronounced after indictment: capital indictment rates
ranged from 72% in "high density" (urban) areas to 85% in each
"medium density" (suburban) and "low density" (rural) areas, a
91
fairly modest differential. But things changed as cases moved
down the capital litigation funnel. The JLARC study found that
prosecutors in suburban localities were almost three times more
likely to seek the death penalty all the way through a contested
trial or sentencing than prosecutors in urban localities. 95 In other
words, prosecutors differed only a little in their decisions whether
to indict capital cases. They differed a lot in deciding whether to
bargain for less than death. Hence, primarily as a result of differences in the willingness of prosecutors to plea bargain in capital
cases, death sentences were disproportionately a suburban and
96
rural phenomenon in Virginia, at least as late as 1999.

90. See ABA AsSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 118 (describing detailed pre-indictment
review practices in one jurisdiction).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 388 (noting the time and expense involved in prosecuting a defendant
with mental retardation).
93. JLARC REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
94. Id. at 32 fig.11.
95. See id. at 39 fig.15.
96. Id. at 28. JLARC noted that such "outcomes ... are not easily reconciled on the
grounds of fairness." Id. at Preface.
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THE FUTURE OF VIRGINIA'S DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING
FAIRNESS AND CONSIDERING COSTS

Most public debate about the death penalty focuses on death
sentences and executions. 97 Those, after all, pose fundamental
questions: Should the state take life as a sanction for crime? Do
we have the capacity to reliably distinguish the guilty from the
innocent? Do we make fair choices between those who live and
those who die? My aim in this short symposium essay has been to
point out a reality that gets obscured in that debate. Death sentences are really the tip of a much larger iceberg of capital litigation. Most of the time, and increasingly over the past twenty
years, the practical function of the death penalty is to serve as
leverage in a plea bargain. 98
I offer that as an observation of fact, not as judgment condemning or applauding the trend. 99 My modest suggestion to policymakers is simply that they should consider the iceberg as well as
the tip. We need a careful study to see if our current practices,
which depend so heavily on plea bargaining judgments of independently elected prosecutors across Virginia, are fair when
viewed in statewide perspective. And we need to consider the

97. See, e.g., Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.
aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (demonstrating that the major issues of contention with
the death penalty relate to sentences and execution).
98. See supra Part I.E; see also Christopher Solgan, Life or Death: The Voluntariness
of Guilty Pleas by Capital Defendants and the New Yorh Perspective, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. R'rs. 699, 702 (2000) (explaining that prosecutors use the death penalty in plea
agreements); see also Death Penalty Often a Plea Bargaining Tool, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1110 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (demonstrating that in Ohio most death penalty indictments end in plea agreements). See generally
Joseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2313 (2001) (discussing the development and prevalence of the death penalty as leverage
in plea bargaining).
99. There is a vigorous debate about the appropriateness of plea bargaining in capital
cases. A prominent opponent argues that plea bargaining "mocks" or "devalues" the moral
position of death penalty proponents, promotes inequality of treatment, increases costs
and waste, and devalues the role of defense counsel. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 674, 677, 680 (2009). The Supreme
Court, by contrast, has held that a defendant's choice to plead guilty to avoid the death
penalty does not make the plea involuntary. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39
(1970).
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costs, and cost-effectiveness, of a system which· charges death
more than twenty times for each death sentence it produces. 100

A. Fairness: Does Winnowing by Plea Negotiation Produce Fair
Results?
Virginia's system of capital litigation winnows out nineteen of
twenty capital charges for every death sentence it produces,
largely based on plea-bargaining choices by independently elected
101
commonwealth's attorneys. When JLARC looked at that process
for cases now almost twenty years old, it found that the outcomes
"are not easily reconciled on the grounds of fairness." 102 Locality,
more than any other factor, determined the likelihood that a
prosecutor would seek a death sentence. 103
Without another effort like JLARC's detailed statistical study,
it is hard to say whether this locality effect has become more or
less acute since 1999, or how it may evolve in the future. Ironically, as plea bargaining resolves a greater percentage of cases, we
would expect that differences across localities would diminish.
Stated more bluntly, if virtually every case results in a bargain
for a life sentence, there is little difference in outcomes across localities.
But that kind of future seems unlikely. Inevitably, some cases
will not be bargained, and prosecutors will differ in choosing
those cases. The trickle of death sentences we have seen in the
past decade still tilts toward a few, primarily suburban jurisdictions.101 The list of capital indictments in recent years shows comparatively few cases in the state's urban centers and higher num105
bers in areas of medium or low population density.
If the
experience of other states is an indicator, the locality effect will
linger, even as death sentencing diminishes. 106 We may choose to
100. Sec supra Part I.D.
101. VIDC REVIEW, supra note 3, at apps. A-B; see supra Part I.D.
102. JLARC REPOHT, supra note 6, at Preface.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Prince William and Fairfax Counties account for six of the sixteen death sentences
in Virginia since 2004. VCCC Data, supra note 20, at Capital Convictions table.
105. See Spreadsheets Listing Capital Murder Indictments from 2008 to 2013 (unpublished data) (on file with the Supreme Court of Virginia Case Management System).
106. See RICHAHD DIETEH, THE 2% DEATH PENAL'rY: How A MINOHITY OF COUNTIES
PHODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENOHMOUS COSTS TO ALL 9 (2013), available at http://
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defend that system as a consequence of local democracy. As
JLARC observed, it may be harder to defend on grounds of fair101
ness.
Finally, one other factor should give us pause as plea bargaining becomes the principal means for choosing life or death. A bargain requires the defendant's agreement. Some defendants land
on death row not because the prosecutor failed to offer a plea to a
life sentence, but because the defendant rejected the offer. Indeed, experienced capital defense lawyers estimate that more
than half of defendants sentenced to death were offered a plea to
life along the way. 108 At best this system promotes a level of randomness in outcomes of capital cases. At worst it tilts death sentences toward defendants who get poor advice from their lawyers,
defendants with mental deficiencies who fail to appreciate the
hard choices they face, or defendants with plausible claims of in109
nocence.
B. The Cost Efficiency of Winnowing Capital Cases by Plea
Bargain
We think of plea bargaining as a cost-saving device. When we
look only at a single case, we see that a guilty plea saves the cost
of trial and (sometimes) of lengthy appeals. But a different picture may emerge if we look at capital cases on the whole, adopting the kind of perspective a legislator might take in assessing
the cost efficiency of any criminal justice policy. 110
Start with costs. Even in a system with heavy reliance on plea
bargaining, the choice to bring a capital charge results in substantially higher cost than the noncapital alternative.m That is
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf (demonstrating the lack of
proportion in death penalty sentencing between counties).
107. JL.ARC REPORT, supra note 6, at Preface.
108. Altschuler, supra note 99, at 671-72.
109. Thaxton, supra note 25, at 490 (suggesting that cognitive and emotional deficits
make many capital defendants less likely to accept favorable plea bargains).
110. Unlike several death penalty states, Virginia has not yet undertaken that kind of
cost-benefit assessment. A recent Kansas study concluded that defending a death penalty
case costs about four times as much as defending a capital-eligible murder case where
death was not sought. JUD. COUNCIL, KAN. LEGISLATURE, REPOHT OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL DEATH PENALTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 15 (2014), available at http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/documents/KSCost2014.pdf.
111. See id.
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primarily because so much of the added cost of a capital case
must be spent before trial. 112 A recent study in th_e federal system
estimated that capital cases ending in a guilty plea were more
than three times as costly as noncapital cases resolved by trial. 113
Studies from several states echo that finding. 111 Therefore, Virginia's prevailing pattern of waiting until after indictment to winnow
out most capital charges virtually insures high costs, even as it
produces few death sentences.
Now consider what we "buy" for those costs. Mostly we buy
bargaining leverage. Without detailed study, however, it is hard
to know what practical difference that bargaining leverage really
makes. Do we get fewer costly trials? Probably not. There is no
solid evidence that bringing a capital charge increases the likelihood of resolving the case through a guilty plea. 115 Indeed, the opposite may be true. 116 Do we get higher sentences for murderers?
For some, probably yes. It does seem likely that, on the whole,
prosecutors who charge capital murder will obtain higher bargained-for sentences than prosecutors who negotiate pleas from

112. See 'l'EHANCE D. Mrnnrn, DEP"l' OF CHIMINAL JUS'l'ICE, UNIV. OF NEV., LAS VEGAS,
Estimates of Time Spent in Capital and Non-Capital Murder Cases: A Statistical Analysis
of Survey Data from Clarh County Defense Attorneys 4 tbl.1 (2012) (showing an expenditure of two to four times the attorney hours on the pretrial stage of a capital trial than all
other stages combined); see also MOLLY '!'HEADWAY JOHNSON & LAUHAL L. HOOPER, FED.
JUDICIAL C•m., RESOURCE GUIIJE FOR MANAGING CAPITAL CASES-VOLUME I: FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY 'l'HIALS 2 (2004) ("[Capital] cases require early judicial management and
substantial pretrial planning because they may involve the most severe form of punishment that society can inflict on its members-death. The process by which the prosecution
determines whether it will seek the death penalty is itself time-consuming and demands
considerable effort of both the prosecution and the defense.'').
113. Thaxton, supra note 25, at 545.
114. Id.
115. Compare Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 140 (2006) (concluding that threat of death penalty
did not increase the likelihood of a guilty plea), with Thaxton, supra note 25, at 475-76
(concluding that the threat of the death penalty increases the probability of a plea agreement by 20-25%, an amount insufficient to offset the added costs of capital cases that go
to trial).
116. In Virginia, despite the high number of bargained-for resolutions in capital cases,
the rate of trial in capital cases still exceeds the trial rate for noncapital cases. See supra
Part I.E. I estimate a capital jury trial rate of about 8% and a similar bench trial rate of
8% in the past five years. See supra Part I.D. The rate of jury trials in Virginia in felony
cases in 2013 was 1.2%, and the rate for felony crimes against the person was 4.4%. VCSC
REPORT, supra note 70, at 30-31. Bench trials accounted for 9% of all felony convictions.
Id.
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the sta:i;ting point of an indictment for first degree murder. 117 But
the difference may be more symbolic than real. The threat of a
death sentence may induce a plea to life without parole. Still,
even without that leverage, a plea to first degree murder likely
will keep the convict in prison well into old age. 118 The practical
difference may be a few years of geriatric release.
Virginia's budget-makers may differ in their assessments of
these costs and benefits. My point is simply that they should not
undertake that assessment without recognizing the pervasive influence of current charging and plea-bargaining practices.
CONCLUSION-A MODEST SUGGESTION FOR REFORM BY
NARROWING THE FUNNEL

Virginia could substantially reduce the statewide costs of its
death penalty system with little change in the ultimate outcome
of capital cases. To do so would require winnowing out at the indictment stage some of the cases that currently get winnowed after indictment; narrowing the top of our capital litigation funnel
before we spend millions litigating cases that will be bargained
down to lesser sentences anyway. We could accomplish that
through a variety of means, steps that would bring the added
benefit of consistency to a system now characterized by differences based on locality.
Without changing the fundamental structure of local control,
we could encourage more exacting review at the indictment stage.
A few commonwealth's attorneys have developed policies for that
purpose. 119 At the federal level, the Department of Justice requires extensive pre-indictment review. 120 An ABA study recommended that Virginia commonwealth's attorneys develop advisory
guidelines or consultative processes to guide discretion in bring-

117. See Kuziemko, supra note 115, at 116, 140.
118. On average, defendants convicted of "more serious" first degree murder in Virginia
serve forty-five years. VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, A DECADE OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN
VIRGINIA 2, available at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/Mar_05/'l'IS_Brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
119. ABA ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 117-19.
120. See DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL 9-10.030-.040 available at http:
//www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/ 1Omcrm.htm#9-10. 030 (last
updated April 2014).
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ing capital charges. 121 Some states have adopted similar guidelines.122 Any of these steps would help to address the concerns
over fairness that JLARC highlighted more than a decade ago,
and save money in the process.
There is a simpler and more effective way to limit capital litigation costs with little change in outcomes. Remove robbery,
standing alone, as a predicate for capital murder. 123 That statutory change alone would reduce the iceberg of capital litigation by
about half. 12·1 The JLARC study found that robbery-murder cases
account for more capital murder indictments than all other predicates combined. 125 Yet cases where robbery is the only predicate
almost never result in a death sentence. 126 Indeed, had Virginia
made that change to its capital murder statute ten years ago, it
would have saved millions in cost without affecting a single death
sentence. 127 It would have made our system more consistent
across localities, and we would have preserved the charging authority of commonwealth's attorneys.
Capital cases are expensive. They should be with so much at
stake. I do not suggest that we reduce costs by cutting corners in
investigation, prosecution, or defense of individual cases. Nor do I
argue that plea bargaining has no place in capital cases. I only
observe that Virginia's capital litigation system has achieved a
very costly equilibrium. We indict a comparatively high number
of death cases. Then, after substantial expense, we almost always
bargain them away for noncapital results. We have invested
heavily in a death penalty that serves mostly as a bargaining
chip. As we consider the future of Virginia's death penalty, that
state of affairs should concern policy makers, regardless of their
views on the death penalty.

121. See ABAASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 120 & n.63.
122. Id. at 120 n.63.
123. This would mean repealing Virginia Code section 18.2-31(4) (Hepl. Vol. 2014).
124. The JLAHC study found that 56% of capital murder indictments had robbery as
the sole predicate. JLAHC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30 fig.10.
125. The JLARC study found that 56% of capital murder indictments had robbery as
the sole predicate. JLAHC REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
126. See VCCC Data, supra note 20.
127. Id.

